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The control of animal diseases is an issue of particular interest in animal production chains. 
Because of their direct impact on production, animal diseases generate income shortfalls for 
farmers. In some cases, diseases may also have lead to human health problems and undermine 
market  access  conditions.  Because  of  these  potential  negative  impacts,  some  diseases  are 
regulated. But for many communicable diseases, much latitude is given to individual control 
of the disease by farmers. In the case of a communicable disease, individual management 
therefore generates an externality, as individual decisions have an impact on the level of risk 
exposure of other farms to the disease. Thus, the collective result of individual management 
may differ from the collective expectations. This gap can be reduced by collective actions. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  conceptual  framework  for  the  study  of  collective 
management of animal diseases, which will provide management tools to collective managers 
of animal health. The development of this conceptual framework rests on three steps. We first 
discuss the means to model the individual decisions of farmer in regard to animal diseases. 
Then it should take into account the interaction between the epidemiology of the disease and 
the individual decisions of farmers, by the coupling of epidemiologic and economic models. 
Finally, collective management tools are introduced in these models in order to test incentives 
schemes  for  horizontal  coordination.  Finally,  collective  actions  are  introduced  in  these 
models,  in  order  to  test  devices  for  horizontal  coordination  (management  of  prevalence 
between farms).  
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   Introduction 
The control of livestock diseases is a major concern for intensive animal production areas like 
Western France. Animal diseases are an important source of vulnerability due to the diversity 
of their impacts. They can create substantial shortfalls for farms, by degrading their technical 
and economic performance (production losses) and may lead, for some of them, to the loss of 
commercial opportunities. The control of animal diseases also implies the allocation of 
resources, both ex ante in terms of surveillance and prevention and ex post in order to mitigate 
the sanitary and economic consequences if the disease occurs (curative expenditure, for 
example). These shortfalls and cost induced by animal diseases weigh heavily on the 
economy of farms and have wider effect on the competitiveness of animal production chains. 
Beyond the direct impact of diseases on the livestock sector, animal diseases can have a 
broader impact on regional and national agricultural economies (animal feed, for example), as 
well as on firms engaged in the food processing of animal products.  
The management of animal health is nevertheless complicated by the varying biological 
characteristics of the diseases and difficulties arising in their control. The most problematic 
element probably refers to the transmissible nature of many diseases; contagious pathogens 
may easily spread from one farm to another. Different transmission modes exist: direct 
contact between animals from different herds (contact over fences at pasture, for example), 
animal purchases, environmental contamination, exchanges of contaminated materials 
between farms… Some diseases are transmitted by animal vectors (insects, small mammals, 
wildlife). The communicability of pathogens gives rise to externalities, which imply that 
decisions taken at the farm level may have sanitary – and therefore – economic consequences 
for other farms with witch the farm is related.  
A farmer who decides to protect his herd against a particular disease by vaccinating or 
adopting strict biosecurity measures (hygiene, quarantine, for example) would create a 
positive externality, in that its action would benefit to other farmers by lowering the infection 
pressure (risk of occurrence of the disease). Conversely, a farmer could be encouraged to 
behave as a free rider seeking to benefits from the efforts of its neighbours, without bearing 
the costs. This behaviour would generate a negative externality since this behaviour would 
help to maintain the disease within the geographic area considered. This results in strong 
interrelationships of individual decisions to control animal disease at the area level. Note also 
(by analogy with the atomicity assumption of perfect competition) that the epidemiological 
situation observed across a geographical area may only vary if a sufficient number of farmers 
in the area implement a given control measure. For communicable diseases, the effectiveness 
of control measures will often depends on the ability to act in a coordinated manner across a 
group of operations (horizontal coordination). 
This paper focuses on collective actions to control animal diseases, for witch management 
decisions do not take place on a collective level, but is left to individual initiative 
(decentralized decision-making). This paper puts specific emphasis on endemic diseases that 
may not be regulated and their control involves horizontal coordination requirements. The aim 
of this work is to outline a conceptual framework for understanding the collective 
management of animal diseases and to present the main implications in terms of research 
needs. 
The challenges of this research are at two levels. At the societal level, this research aims to 
make available to collective animal health managers more effective decision tools. These 
managers are involved in the definition of sanitary policies across an area (eradication, control 
of the spread of a disease). Management decisions are currently taken on the basis of epidemiological approaches which implicitly assume that the measures advocated by the 
collective manager will be systematically implemented by the farmers. These approaches 
generally omit the fact that decisions to implement the measures are decided on a voluntary 
basis by each farmer on the basis of their own economic interests, regardless the collective 
goal promoted by the collective manager. This reasoning can lead the managers to make 
wrong decisions (waste of resources, choice of wrong types of intervention …). The 
effectiveness of collective actions should be improved by introducing incentives to remove 
the potential obstacles to measures adoption par the farmers. From an academic point of view, 
the work outlined a challenge for economic analysis. Different tools exist in many sub-
disciplinary fields (agricultural economics, but also human health economics, environmental 
economics, economics of risk and uncertainty, theory of agency, etc.) that could be 
judiciously combined to develop a relevant analytical framework. It is also beyond and enrich 
standard economic approaches by integrating the contributions of epidemiological modelling. 
The main idea developed in this paper is the coupling of economic and epidemiologic models. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that individual decisions are part of an epidemiological context 
and given in return, the epidemiological context is influenced by individual decisions 
(aggregated). The purpose of the work to be done is the construction of a tool for decision 
support, by revisiting the terms of collective action in animal health management and taking 
explicitly into account the decentralized nature of decision-making process.  
The implementation of this approach involves three steps that will be successively discussed 
in the paper, namely: 1) the modelling of the farmer’s individual decisions in regard to animal 
health management, 2) the coupling of epidemiologic and economic models to assess the 
outcomes at a collective level, and 3) the design of incentive mechanisms. 
1.- Modelling individual behaviours 
The first step attempts to model the farmer’s decision process in regard to animal disease 
management. The key assumption is that farmers behave rationally. The decision to 
implement – or not – a control measure is individually taken by farmers on the basis of their 
own economic calculation. Control decisions are usually taken in a broader context of 
resource allocation, which implies a tradeoff between disease management and other uses of 
scarce resources (money, labour). The economic behaviour of the farmer is influenced by 
several factors, including the economical context, the institutional setting, the farm and 
farmer’s characteristics and biophysical factors, among which animal diseases (Chilonda et 
Van Huylenbroeck, 2001) (figure 1.). 
 
Figure 1.- Conceptual model of factors influencing decisions made by small-scale farmers in animal 
health management (Chilonda et Van Huylenbroeck, 2001).   
The challenge in modelling farmers’ individual behaviours in relation to animal health is to 
take into account the fact that individual control decisions are taken in regard to a particular 
disease at two levels: (1) at the farm level the sanitary status of the herd (within-herd 
prevalence, expression of the disease) will have an impact on production; (2) but also, in the 
case of a communicable disease, for a group of farms in contact, the expression of the disease 
(between-herd prevalence) will impact on the probability for a farm operating in an area to be 
infected due to animal purchases, neighbourhood contacts, airborne transmission, etc. To 
model these individual behaviours, it becomes necessary to model the impact of the disease 
on the production on the one hand, to establish a relationship between the output and the 
control inputs on the other hand. Finally, in the case of communicable diseases, the model 
should take into account the uncertain nature of the herd’s infection.  
In the economic literature, little attention has been paid to the formalization of farmer’s 
behaviour in regard to animal disease control in a neoclassical way. This issue emerged in the 
late 1980s in the United Kingdom (McInerney, 1996). Based on the production function 
concept, basic microeconomic approaches were implemented 1) to show how the disease 
could alter the shape of the production function (McInerney, 1988), 2) to define the loss-
expenditure frontier concept, which highlighted the tradeoffs made by the farmer between the 
production losses caused by the disease on the one hand, and control expenses on the other 
hand (McInerney, Howe and Schepers, 1992). The adopted approach is the minimization of 
the economic cost of the disease (understood as the sum of the losses induced by the disease 
and the control expenditures). In the 1990s, the question of the profile of the loss-expenditure 
frontier was discussed by Tisdell (1995), who also adapted McInerney’s framework to the 
multiple diseases management. Finally, inspired by developments in the economic literature 
on pesticide use (damage abatement function), Chi et al. (2002) have finally taken in 
consideration the problem of modelling the farmer’s behaviour in regard to animal diseases, 
with a particular focus on the tradeoff between preventive and curative expenditures. In this 
latter work, the farmer's decisions are based on the level of the disease, which simultaneously 
covers the prevalence and severity. 
The main limitation of these first attempts to formalize the farmer’s animal health decisions is 
that they consider a farm in isolation and do not take into account the fact that the farm faces a 
risk of infection. Decisions are taken in regard to the epidemiological situation of the herd, 
and the epidemiological situation within the herd is only influenced by the farmer’s decisions. 
This assumption may only hold in the case of non-communicable diseases. For communicable 
diseases, it is reasonable to assume that the farmers takes primarily into account the herd’s 
sanitary conditions (prevalence and severity of the disease) when taking his decisions in 
regard to disease control, but the risk of infection (or re-infection) of the herd remains 
influenced by the inter-herd prevalence in the geographical area considered.  
The modelling of farmers’ individual behaviors in regard to animal disease management will 
have to take into account: (1) the epidemiological situation of the herd, which could lead to a 
first integration of epidemiological elements (within-herd model) because the possible 
evolutions of the herd’s epidemiological situation will affect the actions implemented by the 
farmer, and ; (2) the between-herd epidemiological situation, which constitute an external risk 
for the herd. The model should then take explicitly into account the risk and uncertainty 
which vitiates the decision-making process.  
A crucial element for our concerns is the inclusion of time in our model The choice of a type 
of model (static vs. dynamic) is intimately linked to the livestock system considered which involves different length of longer or shorter rearing cycles of the respective disease and 
control measures available (single decision on the planning horizon vs. repeated decisions). 
For repeated decisions with fully reversible choice, a static model can be used. Rat-Aspert and 
Fourichon (2010) used a decision tree at each time step to formalize the decision of farmers. 
But when the decision is not fully reversible, and when evolution of the epidemiological state 
of the farm account for the decision, using dynamic programming seems necessary. This issue 
also raises the question of the planning horizon of the farmer (reasoning taking into account 
the dynamic reasoning versus steady state). The nature of the choice of farmers that is 
modellised (discrete choices such as vaccination or standard consumption model with 
continuous variable) leads to different tools. For a discrete choice, a decision tree can be used, 
while for a continuum of choice, farmers’ choice must be modellised by the profit 
optimization of a production function. The latter case allows studying the tradeoff in resource 
allocation between control expenditures and other farm inputs.  
Depending on the characteristics of the disease considered, it is also conceivable to improve 
the realism of the model from different aspects. The model could, for example, explicitly 
address problems of information (imperfect information on the local epidemiological context, 
for example). It could also take into account risk aversion of the farmer, for example.  
2. Coupling of epidemiologic and economic models 
The first step that modelled individual behaviours does not account for an important issue in 
animal diseases: for transmissible diseases, the sanitary situation of a farm (within-herd 
prevalence) has an impact on the sanitary situation in an area (between-herd prevalence), and 
vice versa. So, when a farmer protects his own herd, he also protects the other herds, by 
reducing the probability for other herds to be infected. Individual management of 
transmissible disease therefore creates a positive externality. This second step aims to 
evaluate the impact at a collective scale of decision taken at an individual scale by a large 
population of farmers. To that purpose, models designed to represent individual behaviours 
must be coupled with an epidemiologic model at a between-herd level, taking into account the 
spread of the disease when means of control are - or not - implemented at the scale of farms. 
The coupling of economic and epidemiologic models is an idea that emerged nearly 20 years 
ago, leading in health economics to the sub-disciplinary field of economic epidemiology 
(Brito et al. 1991; Philipson, 1999 ; Gersovitz and Hammer, 2001 and 2003). It is only very 
recently that early works sought to transpose this approach to the issue of collective control of 
endemic animal diseases (Gramig, 2008; Rat-Aspert and Fourichon, 2010). 
The main idea is that, in the case of a non regulated endemic disease, the individual decision 
of farmers to manage a disease at the herd level is made based on the health status of livestock 
and the local epidemiological context. The prevalence of the disease in the area, as well as the 
health status of the herd, are key elements in decision-making. The decision affects the local 
epidemiological context. The dynamic coupling of an epidemiologic model (which describes 
the evolution of the local epidemiological context based on the decisions taken by the 
farmers) and an economic model (which describes the decision making of farmers according 
to the local epidemiological context) allows combining, in a unified framework the 
contributions of economic and epidemiological approaches. This reasoning can be illustrated 
on the basis of Rat-Aspert and Fourichon. (2010) (figure 2.) 
  
Figure 2.- Coupling economics and epidemiology 
 
In the case of a management decision repeated over time (i.e. the farmer decides each time 
period to act or not against the disease), such an approach allows to follow the evolution of 
the prevalence and level of effort by farmers over time. Feedbacks between individual 
decisions and prevalence lead to fluctuations related to the fact that control efforts made by 
the farmer depend on the external risk. This high degree of effort has an impact on the 
prevalence of the disease in the area, which in turn may cause farmers to change their levels 
of effort. It follows that these changes in prevalence may - or may not - result in an 
equilibrium. Figure 3 gives an example of these situations for an endemic disease controlled 
by voluntary vaccination 
 
Figure 3. - Evolution over time of the proportions of herds in the state Susceptible S (grey curve), Infectious I 
(black curve), Recovered R (grey dotted curve) and Vaccinated V (black dotted curve) herds with (a) a strong 
heterogeneity of losses and with (b) a smaller heterogeneity of the losses 
 
The coupling of economic model to an epidemiologic model also allows the study of 
epidemiological and economic equilibrium (Figure 4). The economic model determines the 
effect level of effort by farmers, depending on the prevalence of the disease. The 
epidemiologic model provides value for its prevalence as a function of the intensity of efforts 
of farmers.     
Figure 4. - The relationship between the proportion of infectious herds and the proportion of vaccinated herds. 
The grey curve shows the proportion of farmers with a susceptible herd who decide to vaccinate their herd as a 
function of the prevalence, the black curve shows the prevalence of the disease at the equilibrium for a given 
value of the proportion of vaccinated herds. The crossing of the two curves gives the value of the prevalence I* 
and of the proportion of vaccinated herds V* at the equilibrium. 
Between-herd prevalence is an indicator of the probability for a farm to be infected by the 
disease, the level of effort made by farmers (from the economic model) is, in our example, an 
increasing function of the prevalence (shown by the gray curve in Figure 3). This is the case 
for disease control through vaccination (the higher the prevalence, the higher the risk of 
infection is, and the higher the willingness of farmers to protect their herds by vaccination). 
On the other hand, the effort to control leads to a decrease in prevalence (positive externality 
associated with disease control) (black curve). The comparison of the epidemiologic model 
and economic model then determines the prevalence and control efforts of farmers to reach 
the endemic equilibrium. This equilibrium is achieved when the control effort made by 
farmers for a given level of prevalence corresponds to the effort needed to obtain that 
prevalence. This simple representation of the confrontation between decision and 
epidemiology has similarities with the representations of the market and perfect competition. 
Atomicity of farmers involves they make their decision based on the prevalence but do not 
have the power to "fix" prevalence. The homogeneity of farmers and of the prevalence 
("perfect mobility" of the pathogen) induces a shared risk between all the farmers: each 
farmer suffers the same prevalence. Perfect information is a key assumption of obtaining the 
equilibrium: farmers have perfect knowledge of between-herd prevalence, allowing them to 
adjust the control effort according to the prevalence. 
The illustration above is based on strong assumptions it would be interesting to relax (taking 
account of imperfect information regarding the prevalence of the disease in the area, 
irreversibility means of control, for example). Note also that elements of game theory could 
be mobilized to formalize potential strategic behaviour of farmers (free-riding behaviour, for 
example).  3. Design of incentive mechanisms 
When the individual control of disease induces positive externalities, the efforts of farmers 
may be insufficient to achieve a collective optimum, since individual decisions do not usually 
take into account their impact on collective risk. In human health, Brito et al. (1991) have 
shown, for example, that a voluntary vaccination strategy is strictly dominated by a 
benevolent dictator status, maximizing the collective welfare (defined as the sum of individual 
utilities). The results of individual management of diseases at farm level may then differ in 
various respects of collective expectations, leading to a need to manage collectively this risk.  
Producers may want to influence collectively the management of a disease and its impact in 
their area. Their goal may be epidemiological (disease eradication, limiting viral circulation) 
or economic (maximizing collective welfare). To do so, the collective decision-maker can 
develop individualized plans to control at the farm level (tests on farm animals, remediation). 
They can also incite farmers to control the disease (by providing financial incentives to 
management, through vaccination or through biosecurity measures, the implementation of 
control plans at the farm level). The establishment of networks of exchange of animals based 
on their health status is also possible. However, the success of collective action depends on 
their acceptance by farmers. Collective management of the disease can also include measures 
of risk sharing. Infection of livestock by the disease poses a risk, a mean for collective 
management of that risk is to pool it through insurance mechanisms. This pooling of risk may 
also impact on individual decisions of farmers. 
Predicting the outcome of these collective actions of animal health management is 
complicated because it must take into account individual choices in the implementation of 
control actions. Thus, integration of collective actions in epidemiologic and economic models 
is a support tool for decision makers. It is introduced into the decision model an effect related 
to the means of collective management in place (financial incentives to individual 
management for example). This type of model allows to test scenarios and also to optimize 
means of collective control. It is important to distinguish two stages in the implementation of 
the action of control. As a first step, actions are implemented, they have an impact on the 
epidemiological situation. In a second step, equilibrium of the epidemiological situation is 
reached. This equilibrium may be endemic or control action may lead to eradication. 
Modelling should look at these two stages. The epidemiological desired equilibrium may be a 
result of the model (equilibrium maximizing the objective function of a manager) or may be 
exogenous to the model (when the manager's objective is epidemiological: eradication or 
reduction target in terms of prevalence). The search for the optimum balance does not require 
a dynamic model since the results at equilibrium can be calculated. However, for more 
complex models, the equilibrium values are taken from simulations of the evolution of the 
disease and the decisions of farmers obtained using dynamic models. This dynamic modeling 
is also necessary to optimize the means of achieving equilibrium in the case of an equilibrium 
set exogenously, but also to verify that the equilibrium is achievable in the case of an 
equilibrium optimizing the collective welfare. This objective function must take into account 
the costs for the manager and profits for farmers. The question of the function to be optimized 
depends on the purpose and means of the manager. Indeed, to take the example of farmers’ 
health management groups, a large portion of the funds allocated to the control comes from 
contributions from farmers themselves. Since management is not regulated, looking for 
optimum balance incentives / penalties as proposed by Brito et al. (1991) does not seem 
possible (farmers’ groups can easily provide incentives to management, but the introduction 
of penalties seems inconceivable). Collective management is thus a reallocation of resources 
from farmers. Conclusion 
Because of feedbacks between farmers’ individual decisions and disease spread, it is 
necessary for the study of endemic communicable and non-regulated diseases, to couple an 
epidemiologic model describing the evolution of the disease in an area and an economic 
model describing farmers' decisions based on the health status of their livestock and local 
epidemiological context. This conceptual framework should be the basis for the development 
of integrated models, for testing and optimizing tools for collective control of animal diseases. 
The implementation of this framework for diseases of interest is an important research issue 
in the field of animal health economics. The coupling of economics and epidemiology can 
found another application for externalities due to asymptomatic carrying of pathogens. In this 
latter case, the externality affects the transformer who can be interested in the management of 
the disease.  
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